Thank you for sharing this and for this thoughtful and literate consideration of a wide range of issues.
I learned a lot and was provoked to think, and to read, more.
It does seem to me that the one point not discussed, and which I hope might be in part 2, is the oppression, even terrorisation, of the Palestinian civilians by Hamas since it came to power. There is good basis for the point made in the interview that a 45% vote in 2006 does not mean that all civilians agree with or are responsible for the al-Quassam Brigades, and there is a good point that not all parts of Hamas are militaristic. But by the same token, the state of the Gazan economy prior to Oct 7 (which is cited as a condition to take into consideration when analyzing the event and its consequences) had deterioriated siginificantly since 2006 due to actions attributable to the government itself or to actions of Hamas or Hamas-alligned paramilitary groups. The shutteirng of the agricultural greenhouses, the failure to manage the acquifer to preserve a supply of potable drinking water, the repression of many individual freedoms, physical repression of political or cultural opposition, the redirection of international aid and of basic supplies to military purposes, and the limitations on the mobility of people within and beyond the borders of the Strip are all actions of the government of the strip. Without accounting for that, I dont think we can seriously assess the viability of Hamas as a political actor in any post-war scenario. And I dont think we do justice to Palestinians if we ignore that they suffer from this oppression largely not of their own choosing.
Thank you for sharing this and for this thoughtful and literate consideration of a wide range of issues.
I learned a lot and was provoked to think, and to read, more.
It does seem to me that the one point not discussed, and which I hope might be in part 2, is the oppression, even terrorisation, of the Palestinian civilians by Hamas since it came to power. There is good basis for the point made in the interview that a 45% vote in 2006 does not mean that all civilians agree with or are responsible for the al-Quassam Brigades, and there is a good point that not all parts of Hamas are militaristic. But by the same token, the state of the Gazan economy prior to Oct 7 (which is cited as a condition to take into consideration when analyzing the event and its consequences) had deterioriated siginificantly since 2006 due to actions attributable to the government itself or to actions of Hamas or Hamas-alligned paramilitary groups. The shutteirng of the agricultural greenhouses, the failure to manage the acquifer to preserve a supply of potable drinking water, the repression of many individual freedoms, physical repression of political or cultural opposition, the redirection of international aid and of basic supplies to military purposes, and the limitations on the mobility of people within and beyond the borders of the Strip are all actions of the government of the strip. Without accounting for that, I dont think we can seriously assess the viability of Hamas as a political actor in any post-war scenario. And I dont think we do justice to Palestinians if we ignore that they suffer from this oppression largely not of their own choosing.